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Sierra Leone experienced intense transmission of Ebola virus disease (EVD) from May 
2014 to November 2015 during which a total of 8,704 confirmed cases and over 3,589 
confirmed deaths were reported. Our field observation showed many issues in the EVD 
data management system, which may have contributed to the magnitude and long dura-
tion of the outbreak. In this perspective article, we explain the key issues with EVD data 
management in the field, and the resulting obstacles in analyzing key epidemiological 
indicators during the outbreak response work. Our observation showed that, during 
the latter part of the EVD outbreak, surveillance and data management improved at all 
levels in the country as compared to the earlier stage. We identified incomplete filling 
and late arrival of the case investigation forms at data management centers, difficulties in 
detecting double entries and merging identified double entries in the database, and lack 
of clear process of how death of confirmed cases in holding, treatment, and community 
care centers are reported to the data centers as some of challenges to effective data 
management. Furthermore, there was no consolidated database that captured and 
linked all data sources in a structured way. We propose development of a new application 
tool easily adaptable to new occurrences, regular data harmonization meetings between 
national and district data management teams, and establishment of a data quality audit 
system to assure good quality data as ways to improve EVD data management during 
future outbreaks.
Keywords: ebola virus disease, infectious disease outbreak, surveillance system, epidemiology, public health 
practice, sierra Leone, perspective
Abbreviations: CCCs, Community Care Centers; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CFR, case fatality rate; 
CIF, case investigation forms; DERC, District Ebola Response Centers; ETCs, Ebola Treatment Centers; EVD, Ebola virus 
disease; IDSR, Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response; MoHS, Ministry of Health and Sanitation; VHF, viral hemor-
rhagic fever; WHO, World Health Organization.
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BAcKGrOUND
Sierra Leone experienced intense transmission of Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) from May 2014 to November 2015 when the 
outbreak was officially declared over. The peak of the outbreak, 
which in total recorded 8,704 confirmed cases and 3,589 
confirmed deaths, occurred around November and December 
2014 (1–3). Our observation showed many issues in the EVD 
data management system, which may have contributed to the 
magnitude and long duration of the outbreak. At the peak of 
the outbreak in November 2014, although some information 
on the spatial distribution of known reported cases was avail-
able, reliable epidemiological statistics to determine the actual 
number of confirmed cases and deaths and to effectively monitor 
the outbreak could not be obtained. This difficulty related sub-
stantially to inadequate management and integration of multiple 
data sources. Furthermore, there was limited knowledge of the 
epidemiological situation in some districts due to lack of reliable 
data (2). In collaboration with partner organizations and agen-
cies, especially the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO), Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation (MoHS) staff supported district Ebola 
response teams with cleaning, analysis, and interpretation of 
the epidemiological data in the field. In this perspective article, 
we review the EVD surveillance and data management systems, 
explain the key issues with data gathering in the field, and the 
resulting obstacles in analyzing the epidemiological data and 
indicators during the EVD outbreak response work. We make 
recommendations for establishment of appropriate data man-
agement system during mega outbreaks similar to that seen in 
West Africa from 2014 to 2015.
eBOLA virUs DiseAse DAtA 
MANAGeMeNt AND sUrveiLLANce 
sYsteM iN sierrA LeONe
evD Data Management system
There were two types of data management system used to provide 
timely situation reports and describe the trends of key epidemio-
logical indicators – The Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF, 
English version 0.9.4.0) line list database (4) and a Microsoft 
Excel-based line list database.
the vHF Line List Database
All information collected using case investigation forms (CIF) 
were intended to be entered into the Epi Info VHF database at 
district level. The VHF application is a tool developed by CDC, 
designed to be integrated with Epi Info 7, and used for case and 
contact tracing data analysis and reporting during outbreaks of 
VHF (4). The Epi Info team in CDC headquarters quickly adapted 
the program to enable multi-user data entry and data merging of 
the district data bases at the national level. However, handling 
VHF at the district level confronted the users with several prob-
lems such as difficulties in detecting double entries and merging 
identified double entries. Additionally, the majority of district 
MoHS data managers were not experienced users of the Epi info 
and the VHF application tool. Furthermore, CIFs arrived late at 
District Ebola Response Centers (DERC) and, consequently, the 
VHF database was never up-to-date even in the late stages of the 
outbreak.
MicrOsOFt eXceL-BAseD  
LiNe List DAtABAse
District MoHS data managers used Excel sheets in addition 
to the VHF line list to provide timely reports of cases and 
description of trends. Standard visualization techniques in 
Excel provided simple graphs summarizing data by time, 
place, and person. The main source of data to produce these 
reports were the laboratory sample results, which, in addition 
to sample specific information, had a selected subset of CIF 
variables such as age, sex, location (district, chiefdom, village), 
facility, the date of onset of symptom, the date when specimen 
was collected and received in the laboratory, and the date when 
specimen was tested.
evD Outbreak surveillance Data Flow
Cases were identified through active case finding done by sur-
veillance and ambulance teams, contact tracers, and by passive 
surveillance, which included calls from community, headmen, 
chiefs, and walk-ins at health care facilities. Epidemiological and 
clinical information of persons who were identified as suspect, 
probable, and confirmed [case definitions available in WHO 
report (3)] were collected by the surveillance teams using the 
CIF, which include date of onset, signs and symptoms, demo-
graphic information, date of admission to health care facilities 
including holding centers, Community Care Centers (CCCs), or 
Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs), date of sample collection, date 
of sample testing, date of discharge from health care facilities, 
and status of person either alive or deceased. CIF is the most 
crucial source of information that should capture accurate 
epidemiological and clinical information of identified persons. 
The CIFs were brought back upon completion of field investi-
gation by surveillance officers to DERC where data managers 
enter the information recorded in them into the Epi Info VHF 
database. The blood sample of a suspected or probable case is 
accompanied by a copy of the CIF to the laboratory. DERC also 
received additional information such as live alerts (source of 
alert, person being seen, classification of person as suspect, and 
sample taken), death alerts (swab taken and burial team sent), 
quarantined households (number and food supply), and EVD 
confirmed cases (number of confirmed EVD positive based on 
blood and swab samples in health care facilities), which had to be 
managed on a daily basis. Most DERCs had established a system 
of manual dashboards to display this information. The informa-
tion was then transferred to separate Microsoft Excel sheets or 
Word documents.
Key issues and challenges in evD Data 
Management
Multiple surveillance and data management issues were identi-
fied during field work in November and December 2014.
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DAtA cOLLectiON
The data collection was frequently incomplete on the CIF and 
on the databases (for example, many of the records did not have 
information on date of onset, sex, age, or residence). This is due to 
organizational problems including lack of supervision and inad-
equate training of surveillance officers. At least in the early stage 
of the outbreak, most of the cases were not identified through 
active case finding due to incomplete information on contacts. 
Furthermore, burials could not be accurately quantified in the 
areas known to continue traditional burials. In addition, it was 
difficult to confirm EVD-related deaths due to inadequate post 
mortem mouth swab samples. Thus, the number of confirmed 
EVD-related deaths may have underrepresented the actual 
number of EVD-related deaths. During the peak of the outbreak, 
non-EVD deaths due to diseases such as malaria were expected 
in Sierra Leone. Before the outbreak, malaria accounted for 
approximately 38% of hospital admissions and was responsible 
for about 30% of under-five deaths (4). Furthermore, malaria and 
EVD share common clinical features (3). Consequently, malaria 
may have caused delays in recognizing EVD confirmed cases, 
complicated EVD case management, and the classification of 
EVD-related deaths, since malaria-related deaths may have been 
misclassified as EVD deaths (5).
DAtA trANsMissiON
In the early stages of the outbreak, there was no clear process 
of how death of confirmed cases in holding centers, CCCs, and 
ETCs are reported to the DERC, as there was no structured flow 
of information. Later daily telephone calls were introduced to 
the DERC alert desk from each health care facility. There was 
lack of standardization of reporting deaths from burial teams 
(number of total deaths), the treatment centers (number of 
EVD-related deaths), and the laboratory (number of confirmed 
EVD-related deaths based on swab samples). Ideally, for every 
death, two copies of the original CIF form and for every sus-
pected living case, three copies of the original CIF form should 
have been filled by the surveillance team. One completed form 
should have accompanied the sample to the laboratory, one 
form should have gone to the DERC, and for suspected cases, 
one additional form should have stayed with the patient. At 
least in the first period of the outbreak, this process did not 
function effectively. A lot of information was lost because it 
was not transmitted to the DERC and because of problems with 
compilation of data.
DAtA cOMPiLAtiON
There was no consolidated database that captured and linked 
all data sources in a structured way. Each DERC had adopted 
different methods of recording information on each case. Lack 
of consistency in the use of the Microsoft Excel-based line list 
format caused problems with merging and aggregating cases to 
report critical information such as a total number of new alerts, 
a total number of cases reported, a total number of blood test 
taken, etc., to the national level on a daily and weekly basis. For 
these reasons, much of the data has never found its way into any 
structured database and may never be recoverable.
DAtA cLeANiNG AND ANALYsis
Data that are incomplete and inconsistent are not suitable for use 
in outbreak response planning. Such low data quality issues put 
limitations on measuring critical indicators, such as the case fatal-
ity rate (CFR), incidence rate, the average number of contacts per 
confirmed case, and accurate interpretation of datasets available 
during the first months of the outbreak. Inter alia, this led to an 
underestimation of deaths in the VHF database throughout the 
outbreak. This accounts for the underestimation of deaths in the 
Ebola situation reports. CFR is calculated as number of confirmed 
EVD deaths divided by number of all confirmed cases. However, 
given the underestimation of deaths, the CFR may have also been 
underestimated. An alternative way to calculate CFR is to use 
only cases with information on final outcome. “Final outcome 
deaths” is classified when person died of EVD; however, “final 
outcome alive” is classified only at the end of hospitalization, thus 
“death or alive” may be overestimated in the cases without final 
outcome. The degree of overestimation changed over time as the 
system of data collection improved. In both ways of calculating 
CFR, there are high risks of bias.
The back log of suspect or probable cases were not being 
updated and reported causing delay in reclassification of suspect 
and probable cases. Furthermore, it was not possible to identify, 
in the database, how many of those identified as suspect and 
probable cases became confirmed cases over time.
DAtA DisseMiNAtiON
As a result of key data management challenges mentioned above, 
WHO, together with the MoHS, use the VHF line list database 
only in addition to the more timely data reported in  situation 
reports, which was generated based on the laboratory results 
(3). This dependence on the laboratory data never changed in 
this outbreak even when the number of cases declined to only a 
few per day. It was not possible to use VHF as the database for 
day-to-day information exchange because VHF data had many 
missing variables and was not being updated on time to provide 
a daily situation report to the national Ebola response center in 
Freetown.
cONcLUsiON
Ebola virus disease data collection, collation, and analysis are 
critical components of the surveillance and epidemiological 
investigation pillar of the EVD prevention and control strategy; 
it is, therefore, important to ensure that it is effectively man-
aged. During the latter part of the EVD outbreak, surveillance 
and data management improved at the district and national 
levels in Sierra Leone as compared to the earlier stage. However, 
a complete cleaning and reconciling of all case data was never 
finalized because data collected at the earlier stage of the EVD 
outbreak had many missing variables; in many cases, those miss-
ing variables were not recoverable. This explains the large number 
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of unclassified suspected cases, even at the end of the outbreak. 
Ideally, all suspected cases should have been tested and classified 
as either confirmed or non-EVD case. Cases were doubled entered 
(laboratory data and CIF data are entered independently) in some 
cases rather than having the laboratory data added to the CIF (3). 
Monitoring and interpreting the severity of the outbreak must 
take into account those potential factors, and it requires combina-
tion of well-coordinated and consolidated multiple data sources 
including observed number of cases and deaths in the VHF data-
base, the number of daily call alerts on the deaths, the number of 
reported laboratory swab positive results, active case search (field 
investigation), and review of existing district situation reports.
recOMMeNDAtiONs tO streNGtHeN 
evD DAtA MANAGeMeNt DUriNG 
MAJOr OUtBreAKs
We propose a number of recommendations, which would 
improve EVD data management during future outbreaks. First, 
a new application tool, which is easily adaptable to new occur-
rences (e.g., integrate new parameters and adjust localization 
lists), with a multi-enter function with possibility for detection of 
duplication, merging of double entries, generating a list of miss-
ing data, and with easy export possibility should be developed. 
Such tool should be agreed upon by national MoHS and key 
partners involved in outbreak management and integrated into 
the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system 
in the countries to improve the availability and use of accurate 
and reliable surveillance data for timely response. Furthermore, 
organizations such as WHO, CDC, and NGOs should agree upon 
a unified EVD data management plan, which all organizations 
will support and use during EVD outbreaks. Second, early deploy-
ment of experienced data managers to support local MoHS staff 
and NGO employees in the field during an outbreak would ensure 
early establishment of strong data management systems. Third, 
regular data harmonization meetings between district monitor-
ing and evaluation officers, national and external data managers 
should be conducted to improve data quality and consistency 
at national and district level. Additionally, surveillance officers 
should be closely supervised, monitored, and trained in the 
field by the surveillance coordinators and CIF form checked for 
completeness. Fourth, a disaster data management team should 
train local surveillance officers and data clerks on how to collect 
and enter data. Furthermore, regular field epidemiology and 
data management trainings should be provided for the MoHS 
staff members at the national, district, and primary health care 
levels to strengthen IDSR activities, timely outbreak detection, 
and effective data management. Fifth, a data quality audit system 
to assure good quality data should be implemented at every stage 
of an EVD outbreak.
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